Is Signibility secure?
Yes in the ways you can check — documents encrypted before disk, sealed on completion, a trail that refuses edits — and no in the ways we haven't earned yet: there's no SOC 2 badge here. Both halves are on this page, and every claim links to the policy that states it.
What protects a document
- Encrypted before disk AES-256-GCM, under a key unique to each file — before it is written to storage, not after. A stolen disk or leaked backup yields nothing readable.
- Sealed on completion The last signature seals the PDF and attaches the certificate — who signed, when, and from where. Any later edit breaks the seal visibly, in any reader.
- A trail that refuses edits Hash-chained entries the database refuses to update — not for us, not for anyone. Removing one means deleting the whole document it belongs to.
New to e-signing? How eSignature works walks the whole mechanism these protections sit inside.
How is my account protected?
Sign in with a passkey, or a password stored only as an Argon2id hash. Sessions are kept as hashes, sign-in attempts are rate-limited, and five failures lock the account for 15 minutes.
Passkeys first
Face ID, Touch ID, or a security key — no password to steal. The biometric never leaves your device.
Argon2id-hashed passwords
We never hold the password itself — only a hash designed to be expensive to guess at scale.
Sessions stored as hashes
Tokens are opaque and the server keeps only a SHA-256 hash — our database can't be used to sign in as you.
Guessing is rate-limited
Sign-in attempts are throttled, five failures lock the account, and protected forms carry a bot check.
Per-signer verification
A sender can require a one-time code by email or SMS — a link in the wrong inbox isn't enough to sign.
Share links can lock and expire
On paid plans a read-only link can carry a password and an expiry, and any link can be revoked at once.
Can the audit trail be edited?
No. Sent, opened, consented, signed: each entry is hash-chained to the one before it, and the database refuses edits to them outright, so a changed history shows.
-
Opened
Elena Fischer
9f2c…41ab -
Consented
Elena Fischer
←9f2cb70e…5d19 -
Signed
Elena Fischer
←b70e3ac8…9f04 -
Sealed
Signibility
←3ac8e51d…c8b2
Removing an entry means deleting the whole document it belongs to. What the certificate records about each signer is on the privacy page.
What doesn't Signibility do?
It holds no SOC 2 or ISO 27001 certificate yet, offers no SSO, and its seal is not on Adobe's trusted list. It also doesn't sell your data or track you for advertising. The full list, including the parts that aren't flattering:
No advertising tracking
No ad cookies, no tracking pixels in our emails. The site counts page views with cookieless Cloudflare analytics, and sets a referral cookie only for affiliate visits.
We don't open your documents
Our admin tooling sees counts, titles and statuses and cannot open a document. The app itself must decrypt files to render and seal them, so we limit that access and use it only when the law or your support request needs it. We train nothing on them.
No data sales
We do not sell your data. There is no arrangement under which we would.
No borrowed badges
We hold no SOC 2 or ISO 27001 certificate yet, and offer no SSO or authenticator-app codes; passkeys are the stronger sign-in we do offer. Our claims are the checkable kind, each linked to the policy that states it.
No borrowed trust banner
Our seal certificate is self-issued, not bought from an authority on Adobe's list, so Acrobat shows a yellow identity warning on our PDFs while still confirming the file is unchanged. The certificate and its fingerprint are just below if you want Acrobat to trust it. The audit certificate beside every PDF is the evidence either way.
No pretending about the database
Documents are encrypted; the database around them is not encrypted at the application layer — names, emails and IP addresses are ordinary columns. The privacy page says this too.
The seal certificate
Every completed PDF is sealed with this certificate. Acrobat trusts it only once you tell it to: download the file, open Acrobat's signature panel, choose Signature Properties, then Show Signer's Certificate, and add it to Trusted Certificates. Check the fingerprint first — it must match the one below exactly.
9E:60:13:FF:BD:CE:D2:C6:1D:DD:FC:63:13:BE:AC:59:C7:2C:80:62:71:27:C7:16:62:80:A1:CD:04:E0:13:B9
SHA-256 fingerprint of the certificate
Download the certificate (.cer)Reporting, and the fine print
How to reach us about a problem, and the practical answers a reviewer needs.
[email protected]How do I report a security problem?
Email the address beside this list — it reaches a person, not a queue, and we take reports seriously. The machine-readable version lives at /.well-known/security.txt, the standard path researchers check first.
Is there a bug bounty?
Not yet — we can't promise payouts. We can promise a considered reply from the people who wrote the code, and a fix with your name on the thanks if you want it.
Who else touches our data?
A short list: Cloudflare for the network, our hosting and storage providers (files arrive already encrypted), our email provider, Lemon Squeezy for payments, Google reCAPTCHA and Google sign-in, Twilio only when a sender turns on SMS verification, Dropbox only if you connect it, Sentry for error reports, and a timestamp authority that sees a hash, never the document. The privacy policy lists what each receives and when.
Can you fill in our security questionnaire?
Yes — ask on the contact page and it comes back in writing. Most questionnaires are asking about the three protections at the top of this page: encryption at rest, sealing, and the immutable trail.
Why does Acrobat show a warning on my sealed PDF?
The bar says "At least one signature has problems" and, inside, "signer's identity is unknown". It means Acrobat does not know our certificate, not that the file was changed — the same panel says the document has not been modified since it was sealed. Chrome, Firefox, Edge and Preview show nothing at all. To make Acrobat trust our seal, download the certificate above, check its fingerprint against the one printed there, and add it under Trusted Certificates in Acrobat's signature panel. DocuSign and OneSpan PDFs need the same step. What proves who signed is the audit certificate downloaded beside the PDF: who acted, when, from where, with a hash chain that refuses edits.
The proof is on every plan.
Send a document free — the encryption, the seal and the trail described above are on it from the first one.